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ABSTRACT
In this paper, we present a new semi-decidable procedure to analyze cryptographic protocols for secrecy based on a
new class of functions that we call: the Witness-Functions. A Witness-Function is a reliable function that guarantees the
secrecy in any protocol proved increasing once analyzed by it. Hence, the problem of correctness becomes a problem
of protocol growth. A Witness-Function operates on derivative messages in a role-based specification and introduces
new derivation techniques. We give here the technical aspects of the Witness-Functions and we show how to use them
in a semi-decidable procedure. Then, we analyze a variation of the Needham-Schroeder protocol and we show that
a Witness-Function can also help to teach about flaws. Finally, we analyze the NSL protocol and we prove that it is
correct with respect to secrecy.
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1 INTRODUCTION
In this paper, we present a new semi-decidable procedure for analyzing cryptographic protocols statically
for the property of secrecy in a role-based specification. The main idea of this procedure is to prove the
secrecy of a protocol by proving that it is increasing. Intuitively, an increasing protocol preserves secret.
That means if the level of security of all atomic messages exchanged in the protocol does not decay between
all receiving and sending steps in the protocol, the secret is preserved. For that, we need reliable metrics to
estimate the level of security of atomic messages. This way of seeing secrecy in protocols has been adopted
in some prior works. For instance, in [1], Steve Schneider suggested the rank-functions to analyze protocols
in CSP [2, 3]. These functions were efficient for analyzing several protocols such the Needham-Schroeder
protocol. However, using these functions dictates the protocol implementation in the CSP algebra. Besides,
building these functions is not easy and their existence is not always possible [4]. In [5–8], Houmani et
al. presented universal functions called interpretation functions to statically analyze a protocol for secrecy.
An interpretation function needs to meet some conditions to be "good enough" to run an analysis. They
were successful to analyze many protocols. However, we note that the conditions on these functions were
very restrictive. That’s why only two functions had been given: DEK and DEKAN. Naturally, less we have
restrictions on functions, more we have chance to define many of them and therefore to prove the correctness
of a larger range of protocols. In fact, one function may fail to prove the growth of a protocol but another
may do so. In this regard, we think that the condition of full-invariance by substitution in Houmani’s wrok
is the most blocking one. This condition is though very important since it enables any decision made
on messages of the generalized roles (messages with variables) to be propagated to valid traces (closed
messages). Since the goal of our approach is to build as many functions as we can, we believe that if we
liberate a function from this condition, we will be able to build several functions. However, liberating a
function from a condition may oblige us to take extra precautions when using it. In this paper, we present
the Witness-Functions as new metrics to analyze cryptographic protocols. A Witness-Function is tightly
linked to an interpretation function but does not need the full-invariant by substitution property. In fact, a
Witness-Function provides two attractive bounds that are independent of substitution. This fully replaces
any need to this property. We also introduce the notion of derivative messages by using new derivation
techniques. We exhibit the theorem of protocol analysis with the Witness-Functions. This theorem defines
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a semi-decidable procedure for analyzing cryptographic protocols. Finally, we run an analysis on two
protocols. First, we run an analysis on a variation of Needham-Schroeder protocol in which we show that a
Witness-Function could even teach about flaws. Then, we run an analysis on NSL protocol where we prove
that it is correct with respect to secrecy.
2 PRELIMINARY AND NOTATIONS
Here, we give some conventions and notations that we use in this paper.
+ We denote by C = 〈M, ξ, |=,K,Lw, p.q〉 the context of verification in which our analysis is run. It
contains the parameters that affect the analysis of a protocol:
• M : is a set of messages built from the signature 〈N ,Σ〉 where N is a set of atomic names (nonces,
keys, principals, etc.) and Σ is a set of functions (enc:: encryption, dec:: decryption, pair:: concatena-
tion (that we denote by "." here), etc.). i.e. M = T〈N ,Σ〉(X ). We denote by Γ the set of substitutions
from X → M. We denote by A all the atomic messages inM, by A(m) the set of atomic messages
(or atoms) in m and by I the set of principals including the intruder I . We denote by k−1 the reverse
form of a key k and we assume that (k−1)−1 = k.
• ξ : is the equational theory in which the algebraic properties of the functions in Σ are described by
equations. e.g. dec(enc(x, y), y−1) = x.
• |=C : is the inference system of the intruder under the equational theory. Let M be a set of messages
and m a message. M |=C m means that the intruder is able to infer m from M using her capacity.
We extend this notation to traces as follows: ρ |=C m means that the intruder can infer m from the
messages exchanged in the trace ρ. We suppose that the intruder has the full control of the net as
described by Dolev-Yao model in [9]. That is to say that she can intercept, delete, redirect and modify
messages. She knows the public keys of all agents. She knows her private keys and the keys that she
shares with other agents. She can encrypt or decrypt any message with known keys. Generically, the
intruder has the following rules of building messages:
(int) : M |=Cm [m ∈M ∪K(I)]
(op) :M |=Cm1,...,M |=CmnM |=Cf(m1,...,mn) [f ∈ Σ]
(eq) :M |=Cm
′,m′=Cm
M |=Cm , with (m
′ =C m) ≡ (m′ =ξ(C) m)
Example 2.1.
The intruder capacity can be described by the following rules:
(int) : M |=Cm [m ∈M ∪K(I)]
(concat) :M |=Cm1,M |=Cm2M |=Cm1.m2
(deconcat) :M |=Cm1.m2M |=Cmi [i ∈ {1, 2}]
(dec) :M |=Ck,M |=CmkM |=Cm
(enc) :M |=Ck,M |=CmM |=C{m}k
In this example, from a set of messages, an intruder can infer any message in this set. She can encrypt
any message when she holds the encryption key. She can decrypt any message when she holds the
decryption key and concatenate any two messages and deconcatenate them.
• K : is a function from I toM, that returns to any agent a set of atomic messages describing her initial
knowledge. We denote by KC(I) the initial knowledge of the intruder, or simply K(I) where the
context is obvious.
• Lw : is the lattice of security (L,w,unionsq,u,⊥,>) used to assign security levels to messages. An example
of a lattice is (2I ,⊆,∩,∪, I, ∅) that will be used to attribute to an atomic message α the set of agents
that are authorized to know it.
• p.q : is a partial function that attributes a value of security (or type) to a message inM. Let M be a
set of messages and m a message. We write pMq w pmq if ∃m′ ∈M.pm′q w pmq
+ Our analysis is performed in a role-based specification. A role-based specification is a set of generalized
roles. A generalized role is an abstraction of the protocol where the emphasis is put on a specific agent
and where all the unknown messages, and on which the agent cannot carry out any verification, are sub-
stituted by variables. An exponent i (the session identifier) is added to a fresh message to say that these
components change values from one run to another. A generalized role interprets how a particular agent
understands the exchanged messages. We extract it from a protocol as follows:
– we extract the roles from the protocol.
– we substitute the unknown messages by fresh variables for each role.
The roles are extracted as follows:
– For each agent, we extract from the protocol all the steps in which this principal participates. Then,
we add to this abstraction a session identifier i in the steps identifiers and in the fresh values.
– We introduce an intruder I to express the fact that the received messages and the sent messages are
probably sent or received by the intruder.
– Finally, we extract all prefixes from those roles where a prefix ends by a sending step.
From the roles, we generate the generalized roles. In a generalized role, unknown messages are substi-
tuted by variables to express that the agent cannot be sure about its integrity or its origin. The role-based
specification expresses the notion of valid traces of a protocol. More details about the role-based specifi-
cation could be found in [10–13].
Example 2.2.
Let us consider the Needham-Schroeder protocol given in Table 1.
The generalized roles of the agent A are:
Table 1: The Needham-Schroeder Protocol
p1 = 〈1, A→ B : {A.Na}kb〉.
〈2, B → A : {Na.Nb.B}ka〉.
〈3, A→ B : {Nb}kb〉.
A1G = 〈i.1, A → I(B) : {A.N ia}kb〉
A2G = 〈i.1, A → I(B) : {A.N ia}kb〉.
〈i.2, I(B) → A : {N ia.X.B}ka〉.
〈i.3, A → I(B) : {X}kb〉
The generalized roles of the agent B are:
B1G = 〈i.1, I(A) → B : {A.Y }kb〉.
〈i.2, B → I(A) : {Y.N ib .B}ka〉
B2G = 〈i.1, I(A) → B : {A.Y }kb〉.
〈i.2, B → I(A) : {Y.N ib .B}ka〉.
〈i.3, I(A) → B : {N ib}kb〉
The role-based specification of the protocol in Table 1 isRG(p1) = {A1G, A2G, B1G, B2G}.
Example 2.3.
Let us consider the NSL protocol given in Table 2.
The generalized roles of the agent A are:
Table 2: The NSL Protocol
p2 = 〈1, A→ B : {Na.A}kb〉.
〈2, B → A : {B.Na}ka .{B.Nb}ka〉.
〈3, A→ B : A.B.{Nb}kb〉
A′1G = 〈i.1, A → I(B) : {N ia.A}kb〉
A′2G = 〈i.1, A → I(B) : {N ia.A}kb〉.
〈i.2, I(B) → A : {B.N ia}ka .{B.X}ka〉.
〈i.3, A → I(B) : A.B.{X}kb〉
The generalized roles of the agent B are:
B′1G = 〈i.1, I(A) → B : {Y.A}kb〉.
〈i.2, B → I(A) : {B.Y }ka .{B.N ib}ka〉
B′2G = 〈i.1, I(A) → B : {Y.A}kb〉.
〈i.2, B → I(A) : {B.Y }ka .{B.N ib}ka〉.
〈i.3, I(A) → B : A.B.{N ib}kb〉
The role-based specification of the protocol in Table 2 isRG(p2) = {A′1G , A
′2
G , B
′1
G , B
′2
G}.
+ A valid trace is an interleaving of substituted generalized roles where each message sent by the intruder
can be generated by her using her capacity and by the received messages. We denote by [[p]] the set of
valid traces generated by p.
+ We denote byMGp the set of messages (with variables) inRG(p), byMp the set of closed messages gen-
erated by substitution inMGp . We denote by R+ (respectively R−) the set of sent messages (respectively
received messages) by a honest agent in the role R. Conventionally, we devote the uppercase symbols
for sets or sequences of elements and the lowercase for single elements. For example, M denotes a set
of messages, m a single message, R a role composed of a sequence of steps, r a step and R.r the role
ending by the step r.
+ In our analysis, no restriction on the size of messages or the number of sessions in the protocols is made.
3 INCREASING PROTOCOLS DO NOT REVEAL SECRETS
To analyze a protocol, we need functions to estimate the security level of every atomic message. In this
section, we give sufficient conditions on a function F to guarantee that it is enough good (or reliable) to run
an analysis and we show that an increasing protocol is correct with respect to the secrecy property when
analyzed with such functions.
3.1 C-reliable functions
A function F is said to be well-formed when it returns the lowest value in the lattice, denoted by ⊥, for an
atomic message α that appears in clear. It returns for it in the union of two sets, the minimum "u" of the
two values calculated in each set separately. It returns the uppermost value, denoted by ">", if it does not
appear in this set. These facts are expressed by the definition 3.1.
Definition 3.1. (Well-formed function)
Let F be a function and C a context of verification.
F is well-formed in C if:
∀M,M1,M2 ⊆M,∀α ∈ A(M): F (α, {α}) = ⊥F (α,M1 ∪M2) = F (α,M1) u F (α,M2)
F (α,M) = >, if α /∈ A(M)
A function F is said to be full-invariant-by-intruder if when it attributes a security level to a message α
in a set of messages M , the intruder can never produce another message m that decrease this level (i.e.
F (α,m) w F (α,M)) using her capacity in the context of verification, except when α is intended to be
known by the intruder (i.e. pK(I)q w pαq). This fact is expressed by the definition 3.2.
Definition 3.2. (Full-invariant-by-intruder function)
Let F be a function and C a context of verification.
F is full-invariant-by-intruder in C if:
∀M ⊆M,m ∈M.M |=C m⇒ ∀α ∈ A(m).(F (α,m) w F (α,M)) ∨ (pK(I)q w pαq)
A function F is said to be reliable if it is well-formed and full-invariant-by-intruder. This fact is expressed
by the definition 3.3.
Definition 3.3. (Reliable function)
Let F be a function and C a context of verification.
F is C-reliable if F is well-formed and F is full-invariant-by-intruder in C.
A protocol p is said to be F -increasing when every principal generates increasingly valid traces (substituted
generalized roles) that never decrease the security levels of received components. The estimation of the
value of security of every atom is performed by F . This fact is expressed by the definition 3.4.
Definition 3.4. (F -increasing protocol)
Let F be a function, C a context of verification and p a protocol.
p is F -increasing in C if:
∀R.r ∈ RG(p),∀σ ∈ Γ : X →Mp we have:
∀α ∈ A(Mp).F (α, r+σ) w pαq u F (α,R−σ)
A secret disclosure consists in manipulating a valid trace of the protocol (denoted by [[p]]) by the intruder
using her knowledge K(I) in a context of verification C, to deduce a secret α that she is not intended to
know (expressed by: pK(I)q 6w pαq). This fact is expressed by the definition 3.5.
Definition 3.5. (Secret disclosure)
Let p be a protocol and C a context of verification.
We say that p discloses a secret α ∈ A(M) in C if:
∃ρ ∈ [[p]].(ρ |=C α) ∧ (pK(I)q 6w pαq)
Lemma 3.6.
Let F be a C-reliable function and p an F -increasing protocol.
We have:
∀m ∈M.[[p]] |=C m⇒ ∀α ∈ A(m).(F (α,m) w pαq) ∨ (pK(I)q w pαq)
See the proof 4 in [14]
The lemma 3.6 says that for any atom α in a message produced by an increasing protocol, its security level
returned by a reliable function is kept greater or equal than its initial value in the context, if the intruder is
not initially allowed to know it. Hence, initially the atom has a certain level of security. This value cannot
be decreased by the intruder using her knowledge and the received messages since it is full-invariant-by-
intruder. In every new step of a valid trace, involved messages are better protected since the protocol is
increasing. The proof is then run by induction on the size of the trace using the reliability properties of the
function in every step of the induction.
Theorem 3.7. (Theorem of Correctness of Increasing Protocols)
Let F be a C-reliable function and p a F -increasing protocol.
p is C-correct with respect to the secrecy property.
Proof.
Let’s suppose that p discloses an atomic secret α.
From the definition 3.5 we have:
∃ρ ∈ [[p]].(ρ |=C α) ∧ (pK(I)q 6w pαq) (1)
Since F is a C-reliable function and p an F -increasing protocol, we have from the lemma 3.6:
(F (α, α) w pαq) ∨ (pK(I)q w pαq) (2)
From 1 and 2, we have:
F (α, α) w pαq (3)
Since F is well-formed in C, then:
F (α, α) = ⊥ (4)
From 3 and 4 we have:
⊥ = pαq (5)
5 is impossible because it is contradictory with: pK(I)q 6w pαq in 1.
Then p is C-correct with respect to the secrecy property.
Theorem 3.1 asserts that an increasing protocol is correct with respect to the secrecy property when analyzed
with a reliable function. It is worth saying that compared to the sufficient conditions stated in [8], we have
one less. Thus, in [8], Houmani demanded from the function an additional condition: the full-invariance
by substitution. That’s to say, the interpretation function has also to resist to the problem of substitution of
variables. Here, we liberate our functions from this blocking condition in order to be able to build more of
them. We rehouse this condition in our new definition of an increasing protocol which is required now to
be increasing on valid traces (closed messages) rather than messages of the generalized roles (message with
variables). Therefore, the problem of substitutions is transferred to the protocol and becomes less difficult
to handle.
4 CONSTRUCTION OF RELIABLE INTERPRETATION FUNCTIONS
As seen in the previous section, to analyze a protocol we need reliable interpretation functions to estimate
the level of security of any atom in a message. In this section, we exhibit a constructive way to build these
functions. We first exhibit the way to build a generic class of reliable selections inside the protection of
the most external key (or simply the external key). Then we propose specialized selections of this class.
Finally we give the way to build reliable selection-based interpretation functions. Similar techniques based
on selections were proposed in previous works, especially in [5, 7, 8] to build universal functions based on
the selection of the direct key of encryption and in [15] to check correspondences in protocols. But first of
all, we present the notion of well-protected messages that have valuable properties that we will use in the
definition of reliable selections.
4.1 Protocol analysis in Well-Protected Messages
4.1.1 Well-Protected Messages
Briefly, a well-protected message is a message such that every non public atom α in it is encrypted by at
least one key k such that pk−1q w pαq, after elimination of unnecessary keys (e.g. e(k, d(k−1,m))→ m).
The main advantage of an analysis performed over a set of well-protected messages is that the intruder
cannot deduce any secret when she uses only her knowledge in the context of verification (without using
the protocol rules).
Lemma 4.1.
Let M be a set of well-protected messages inM. We have:
M |=C m⇒ ∀α ∈ A(m).(α is well-protected in m) ∨ (pK(I)q w pαq)
Lemma 4.1 says that from a set of well-protected messages, all atomic messages beyond the knowledge
of the intruder (i.e. pK(I)q 6w pαq) remain well-protected in any message that the intruder could infer.
Indeed, since each atom that does not appear in clear (non-public) in this set is encrypted by at least one
key k such that pk−1q w pαq, then the intruder has to retrieve the key k−1 before she sees α not well-
protected in any message (clear). But, the key k−1 is in its turn encrypted by at least one key k′ such that
pk′−1q w pk−1q. The proof is then conducted by induction on the encryption keys.
Lemma 4.2. (Lemma of non-disclosure of atomic secrets in well-protected messages)
Let M be a set of well-protected messages inM and α an atomic message in M .
We have:
M |=C α⇒ pK(I)q w pαq
Proof.
From Lemma 4.1, we have M |=C α then:
(α is well-protected in α) ∨ (pK(I)q w pαq) (6)
But α is not well-protected in α, then we have:
pK(I)q w pαq (7)
4.2 Discussion and Assumption
Lemma 4.2 expresses an important result. It states that from a set of well-protected messages the intruder
cannot deduce any secret that she is not supposed to know when she uses only her knowledge in the context
of verification (without using the protocol rules). It is worth saying that verifying whether a protocol
operates over a space of well-protected messages or not is an easy task and most of real protocols respect
this condition.
4.3 Building reliable selections
Now, we will focus on building selections such that when they are composed to suitable homomorphisms,
provide reliable interpretation functions. The definition 4.3 introduces the notion of a well-formed selection
and the definition 4.4 introduces the notion of a full-invariant-by-intruder selection.
Definition 4.3. (Well-formed selection)
Let M,M1,M2 ⊆M such that M,M1 and M2 are well-protected.
Let S : A×M 7−→ 2A be a selection.
We say that S is well-formed in C if: S(α, {α}) = A,S(α,M1 ∪M2) = S(α,M1) ∪ S(α,M2),
S(α,M) = ∅, if α /∈ A(M)
For an atom α in a set of messages M , a well-formed selection returns all the atoms inM if M = {α}.
It returns for it in the union of two sets of messages, the union of the two selections performed in each set
separately. It returns the empty set if the atom does not appear in M .
Definition 4.4. (Full-invariant-by-intruder selection)
Let M ⊆M such that M is well-protected.
Let S : A×M 7−→ 2A be a selection.
We say that S is full-invariant-by-intruder in C if:
∀M ⊆M,m ∈M, we have:
M |=C m⇒ ∀α ∈ A(m).(S(α,m) ⊆ S(α,M)) ∨ (pK(I)q w pαq)
The aim of a full-invariant-by-intruder selection is to provide a full-invariant-by-intruder function when
composed to an adequate homomorphism that transforms its returned atoms into security levels. Since a
full-invariant-by-intruder function is requested to resist to any attempt of the intruder to generate a message
m from any set of messages M in which the level of security of an atom, that she is not allowed to know,
decreases compared to it its value in M , a full-invariant-by-intruder selection is requested to resist to any
attempt of the intruder to generate a message m from any set of messages M in which the selection associ-
ated to an atom, that she is not allowed to know, could be enlarged compared to the selection associated to
this atom in M . This fact is described by the definition 4.4.
Definition 4.5. (Reliable selection)
Let S : A×M 7−→ 2A be a selection and C be a context of verification.
S is C-reliable if S is well-formed and S is full-invariant-by-intruder in C.
4.3.1 Reliable selections inside the protection of an external key
Here, we define a generic class of selections that we denote by SEKGen and we prove that any instance of it is
reliable under some condition.
Definition 4.6. (SEKGen: selection inside the protection of an external key)
We denote by SEKGen the class of all selections S that meet the following conditions:
• S(α, α) = A;
(8)
• S(α,m) = ∅, if α 6∈ A(m);
(9)
• ∀α ∈ A(m), where m = fk(m1, ...,mn) :
S(α,m) ⊆ ( ∪
1≤i≤n
A(mi)∪{k−1}\{α}) if fk ∈ EC and pk−1q w pαq and m = m⇓ (10)
• ∀α ∈ A(m), where m = f(m1, ...,mn) :
S(α,m) =

∪
1≤i≤n
S(α,mi) if fk ∈ EC and pk−1q 6w pαq and m = m⇓ (a)
∪
1≤i≤n
S(α,mi) if f ∈ EC and m = m⇓ (b)
S(α,m⇓) if m 6= m⇓ (c)
(11)
• S(α, {m} ∪M) = S(α,m) ∪ S(α,M)
(12)
For an atom α in an encrypted message m = fk(m1, ...,mn), a selection S as defined above returns a
subset (see "⊆" in equation 10) among atoms that are neighbors of α in m inside the protection of the most
external protective key k including its reverse form k−1. The atom α itself is not selected. This set of
candidate atoms is denoted by ∪
1≤i≤n
A(mi)∪{k−1}\{α} in the equation 10. The most external protective
key (or simply the external key) is the most external one that satisfies pk−1q w pαq. A such key must
exist when the set of messages generated by the protocol is well-protected, which is one of our assumptions
above. By neighbor of α inm, we mean any atom that travels with it inside the protection of the external key.
SEKGen defines a generic class of selections since it does not identify what atoms to select precisely inside the
protection of the external key. It identifies only the atoms that are candidates for selection and among them
we are allowed to return any subset.
Proposition 4.7.
Let S ∈ SEKGen and C be a context of verification.
Let’s have a rewriting system→ξ such that ∀m ∈M,∀α ∈ A(m) ∧ α 6∈ Clear(m), we have:
∀l→ r ∈→ξ, S(α, r) ⊆ S(α, l) (13)
We have:
S is C-reliable.
Remark. The condition on the rewriting system →ξ given by the equation 13 in the definition 4.7 is in-
troduced to make sure that the selection in the normal form is the smallest among all forms of a given
message. This prevents the selection S to select atoms that are inserted maliciously by the intruder by ma-
nipulating the equational theory. Hence, we are sure that all selected atoms by S are honest. For example,
let m = {α.D}kab be a message in a homomorphic cryptography (i.e. {α.D}kab = {α}kab .{D}kab ). In
the form {α.D}kab , the selection S(α, {α.D}kab) may select D since it is a neighbor of α inside the pro-
tection of kab, but in the form {α}kab .{D}kab the selection S(α, {α}kab .{D}kab) may not because it is not
a neighbor of α. Then, we have to make sure that the rewriting system→ξ we are using is oriented in such
way that it chooses the form {α}kab .{D}kab rather than the form {α.D}kab because there is no certitude
that D had not been inserted maliciously by the intruder using the homomorphic property in the equational
theory. We assume that the rewriting system we are using meets this condition.
As for Proposition 4.7, it is easy to check that by construction a selection S, that is instance of SEKGen, is
well-formed. The proof of full-invariance-by-intruder is carried out by induction on the tree of construction
of a message. The principal idea of the proof is that the selection related to an atom α in a message m
takes place inside the encryption by the most external protective key (such that: pk−1q w pαq). Thus, an
intruder cannot modify this selection when she does not have the key k−1 (i.e. pK(I)q 6w pk−1q). Besides,
according to Lemma 4.2, in a set of well-protected messages the intruder can never infer this key since it
is atomic. So, this selection can only be modified by people who are initially authorized to know α ( i.e.
pKq w pk−1q and then pKq w pαq). In addition, the intruder cannot neither use the equational theory to
alter this selection thanks to the condition made on the rewriting system in the remark 4.3.1. Therefore any
set of candidate atoms returned by S cannot be altered (enlarged) by the intruder in any message m that she
can infer, as required by a full-invariant-by-intruder selection.
Example 4.8.
Let α be an atomic message and m a message such that: pαq = {A,B} and m = {A.C.α.D}kab . Let
S1, S2 and S3 be three selections such that: S1(α,m) = {k−1ab }, S2(α,m) = {A,C, k−1ab } and S3(α,m) =
{A,C,D, k−1ab }. These three selections are C-reliable.
4.4 Instantiation of reliable selections from the class SEKGen
Now that we defined a generic class of reliable selections SEKGen, we will instantiate some concrete selections
from it, that are naturally reliable. Instantiating SEKGen consists in defining selections that return precise sets
of atoms among the candidates allowed by SEKGen.
4.4.1 The selection SEKMAX
The selection SEKMAX is the instance of the class S
EK
Gen that returns for an atom in a message m all its
neighbors, that are principal identities, inside the protection of the external protective key k in addition to
its reverse key k−1. (MAX means: the MAXimum of principal identities)
4.4.2 The selection SEKEK
The selection SEKEK is the instance of the class S
EK
Gen that returns for an atom in a messagem only the reverse
key of the external protective key. (EK means: External Key)
4.4.3 The selection SEKN
The selection SEKN is the instance of the class S
EK
Gen that returns only its neighbors, that are principal iden-
tities, inside the protection of the external protective key. (N means: Neighbors)
Example 4.9.
Let α be an atom and m a message such that: pαq = {A,C} and m = {{{α.E}kab .F}kac .D}kad
SEKMAX(α,m) = {E,F, k−1ac }; SEKEK (α,m) = {k−1ac }; SEKN (α,m) = {E,F}
4.5 Specialized C-reliable selection-based interpretation functions
Now, we define specific functions that are a composition of an appropriate homomorphism and instances
of the class of selections SEKGen. This homomorphism exports the properties of reliability from a selection
to a function and transforms selected atoms to security levels. The following proposition states that any
function that is a composition of the homomorphism defined below and the selections SEKGen is reliable.
Proposition 4.10.
Let ψ be a homomorphism defined as follows:
ψ : (2A)⊆ 7→ Lw
M 7→
{
> if M = ∅
u
α∈M
ψ(α) if not.
such that: ψ(α) =
{ {α} if α ∈ I (Principal Identities)
pαq if not.
We have: FEKMAX = ψ ◦ SEKMAX , FEKEK = ψ ◦ SEKEK and FEKN = ψ ◦ SEKN are C-reliable.
The homomorphism ψ in Proposition 4.10 assigns for a principal in a selection, its identity. It assigns for
a key its level of security in the context of verification. This homomorphism ensures the mapping from the
operator "⊆" to the operator "w" in the lattice which offers to an interpretation function to inherit the full-
invariance-by-intruder from its associated selection. In addition, it ensures the mapping from the operator
"∪" to the operator "u" in the lattice, which offers to an interpretation function to be well-formed if its asso-
ciated selection is well-formed. Generally, every function ψ◦S remains reliable for any selection S in SEKGen.
Example 4.11.
Let α be an atom, m a message and kab a key such that:
pαq = {A,B, S}; m = {A.C.α.D}kab ; pk−1ab q = {A,B, S};
SEKEK (α,m) = {k−1ab }; SEKN (α,m) = {A,C,D}; SEKMAX(α,m) = {A,C,D, k−1ab };
FEKEK (α,m) = ψ ◦ SEKEK (α,m) = pk−1ab q = {A,B, S}; FEKN (α,m) = ψ ◦ SEKN (α,m) = {A,C,D};
FEKMAX(α,m) = ψ ◦ SEKMAX(α,m) = {A,C,D}∪pk−1ab q = {A,C,D} ∪ {A,B, S} = {A,C,D,B, S}.
5 INSUFFICIENCY OF RELIABLE FUNCTION TO ANALYZE GENERALIZED ROLES
So far, we presented a class of selection-based functions that have the required properties to analyze pro-
tocols statically. Unluckily, they operate on valid traces that contain closed messages only. Nevertheless, a
static analysis must be led over the finite set of messages of the generalized roles of the protocol because
the set of valid traces is infinite. The problem is that the finite set of the generalized roles contains variables
and the functions we defined are not "enough prepared" to analyze such messages because they are not
supposed to be full-invariant by substitution [16–18]. The full-invariance by substitution is the property
that allows us to perform an analysis over messages with variables and to export the conclusion made-on to
closed messages. In the following section, we deal with the substitution question. We introduce the concept
of derivative messages to reduce the impact of variables and we build the Witness-Functions that operate on
these derivative messages rather than messages themselves. As we will see, the Witness-Functions provide
two interesting bounds that are independent of all substitutions. This fully replaces the property of full-
invariance by substitution. Finally, we define a criterion of protocol correctness based on these two bounds.
5.1 Derivative message
Letm,m1,m2 ∈M; Xm = V ar(m); S1, S2 ⊆ 2Xm ; α ∈A(m);X,Y ∈ Xm and  be the empty message.
Definition 5.1. (Derivation)
We define the derivative message as follows:
∂X = 
∂Xα = α
∂XX = 
∂XY = Y , X 6= Y
∂Xf(m) = f(∂Xm), f ∈ EC ∪ EC
∂{X}m = ∂Xm
∂(X)m = ∂{Xm\X}m
∂S1∪S2m = ∂S2∪S1m= ∂S1∂S2m= ∂S2∂S1m
To be simple, we denote by ∂m the expression ∂Xmm. The operation of derivation introduced by the defi-
nition 5.1 (denoted by ∂) eliminates variables in a message. ∂Xm consists in eliminating the variable X in
m. ∂(X)m consists in eliminating all variables, except X , in m. Hence, X when overlined is considered
as a constant in m. ∂m consists in eliminating all the variables in m.
Definition 5.2.
Let m ∈MGp , X ∈ Xm and mσ be a closed message.
For all α ∈ A(mσ), σ ∈ Γ, we denote by:
F (α, ∂[α]mσ) =
{
F (α, ∂m) if α ∈ A(∂m),
F (X, ∂[X]m) if α = Xσ ∧ α /∈ A(∂m).
A message m in a generalized role is composed of two parts: a static part and a dynamic part. The dynamic
part is described by variables. For an atom α in the static part (i.e. ∂m), F (α, ∂[α]mσ) removes the
variables in m and gives it the value F (α, ∂m). For anything that is not an atom of the static part -that
comes by substitution of some variable X in m- F (α, ∂[α]mσ) considers it as the variable itself, treated as
a constant and as a block, and gives it all the time the same value: F (X, ∂[X]m). For any F such that its
associated selection is an instance of the class SEKGen, F (α, ∂[α]mσ) depends only on the static part of m
since α is not selected. The function in the definition 5.2 presents the three following major facts:
1. An atom of the static part of a message with variables, when analyzed with a such function, is con-
sidered as an atom in a message with no variables (a closed message);
2. A variable, when analyzed by such function, is considered as any component that substitutes it (that
is not in the static part of the message) with no respect to other variables, if any;
3. For any F such that its associated selection is an instance of the class SEKGen, F (α, ∂[α]mσ) depends
only on the static part of m since α is not selected.
One could suggest that we attribute to an atom α in a closed message mσ the value returned by the function
F (α, ∂[α]mσ) given in the definition 5.2 and hence we neutralize the variable effects. Unfortunately, this
does not happen without undesirable "side-effects" because derivation generates a "loss of details". Let’s
look at the example 5.3.
Example 5.3.
Let m1 and m2 be two messages of a generalized role of a protocol p such that m1 = {α.C.X}kab and
m2 = {α.Y.D}kab and pαq = {A,B};
Let m = {α.C.D}kas be a closed message in a valid trace generated by p;
FEKMAX(α, ∂[α]m) =
{
{C,A,B} if m comes by the substitution of X by D in m1
{D,A,B} if m comes by the substitution of Y by C in m2
Hence FEKMAX(α, ∂[α]m) is not even a function on the closed message m since it may return more than one
image for the same preimage. This leads us straightly to the Witness-Functions.
6 The Witness-Functions
Definition 6.1. (Witness-Function)
Let m ∈MGp , X ∈ Xm and mσ be a closed message.
Let p be a protocol and F be a C-reliable function.
We define a Witness-FunctionWp,F for all α ∈ A(mσ), σ ∈ Γ, as follows:
Wp,F (α,mσ) = u
m′∈MGp
∃σ′∈Γ.m′σ′=mσ
F (α, ∂[α]m′σ′)
Wp,F is said to be a Witness-Function inside the protection of an external key when F is afunction such
that its associated selection is an instance of the class SEKGen.
According to the example 5.3, the application defined in 5.2 is not necessary a function inMGp as a valid
trace could have more than one source (or provenance) inMGp and each source has a different static part.
A Witness-Function is yet a function inMGp since it searches all the sources of the closed message in input
and returns the minimum (the union). This minimum naturally exists and is unique in the finite setMGp . A
Witness-Function is protocol-dependent as it depends on messages in the generalized roles of the protocol.
However, it is built uniformly for any pair (protocol, function) in input. For a Witness-Function inside the
protection of an external key, since its associated function calculates the level of security of an atom always
in a message m having an encryption pattern,the search of the sources of the closed message mσ inMGp
(i.e. {m′ ∈MGp |∃σ′ ∈ Γ.m′σ′ = mσ}) is reduced to a search in the encryption patterns inMGp .
6.1 Legacy of Reliability
Proposition 6.2 asserts that a function F inside the protection of an external key transmits its reliability to
its associated Witness-FunctionWp,F . In fact, the selection associated with a Witness-Function inside the
protection of an external key is the union of selections associated with the function F , limited to derivative
messages. It is easy to check that a Witness-Function is well-formed. Concerning the full-invariance-by-
intruder property, as the derivation just eliminates variables (so some atoms when the message is substi-
tuted), and since each selection in the union returns a subset among allowed candidates, then the union
itself returns a subset among allowed candidates (the union of subsets is a subset). Therefore, the selection
associated with a Witness-Function stays an instance of the class SEKGen, so full-invariant-by-intruder. Since
the Witness-Function is the composition of the homomorphism of F and an instance of the class SEKGen, then
it is reliable.
Proposition 6.2.
LetWp,F be a Witness-Function inside the protection of an external key.
We have:
Wp,F inherits reliability from F
See the proof 18 in [14]
Example 6.3.
LetMGp = {{α.B.X}kad , {α.Y.C}kad , {A.Z}kbc};
V ar(MGp ) = {X,Y, Z}; m1 = {α.B.C}kad ; pαq = {A,D}; pk−1ad q = {A,D};
Wp,FEKMAX (α,m1)
= {Definition 6.1}
u
m′∈MGp
∃σ′∈Γ.m′σ′=m1
FEKMAX(α, ∂[α]m
′σ′) = u
{{α.B.X}kad ,{α.Y.C}kad}
σ′={X 7−→C,Y 7−→B}
FEKMAX(α, ∂[α]m
′σ′)
= {Wp,FEKMAX is well-formed from Proposition 6.2}
FEKMAX(α, ∂[α]{α.B.X}kad [X 7−→ C])uFEKMAX(α, ∂[α]{α.Y.C}kad [Y 7−→ B])
={Definition 5.2 and derivation in 5.1}
FEKMAX(α, {α.B}kad) u FEKMAX(α, {α.C}kad)
= {Definition of FEKMAX}
{B,A,D} ∪ {C,A,D} = {B,A,D,C}
6.2 Bounds of a Witness-Function
In Lemma 6.4, we define two interresting bounds of a Witness-Function that are independent of all substi-
tutions. The upper bound of a Witness-Function ranks the security level of an atom α in a closed message
mσ from one confirmed source m (m is a natural source of mσ), the Witness-Function itself ranks it from
the exact sources of mσ that are known only when the protocol is run, and the lower bound ranks it from
all likely sources of mσ (i.e. the messages that are unifiable with m inMGp ). The unification in the lower
bound catches all the principal identities that could participate in a possible intrusion. It is worth mentioning
that the upper bound and the lower bound of the Witness-FunctionWp,F do not depend on the substitution
σ that generates the closed message mσ.
Lemma 6.4.
Let m ∈MGp andWp,F be a Witness-Function inside the protection of an external key.
∀σ ∈ Γ,∀α ∈ A(Mp) we have:
F (α, ∂[α]m) w Wp,F (α,mσ) w u
m′∈MGp
∃σ′∈Γ.m′σ′=mσ′
F (α, ∂[α]m′σ′)
Proof.
For any σ ∈ Γ we have:
• F (α, ∂[α]m) ⊆ Wp,F (α,mσ): sincem is obviously one element of the set {m′ ∈MGp |∃σ′ ∈ Γ.m′σ′ =
mσ} of calculation of Wp,F (α,mσ) (i.e. m is a trivial source of mσ) and since F (α, ∂[α]mσ) does
not depend on σ because, by construction, it depends only on the static part of m (denoted simply by
F (α, ∂[α]m)).
• Wp,F (α,mσ) ⊆ ∪
m′∈MGp
∃σ′∈Γ.m′σ′=mσ′
F (α, ∂[α]m′σ′): since for all m ∈ MGp the set {m′ ∈ MGp |∃σ′ ∈
Γ.m′σ′ = mσ′} (unifications) is obviously larger than the set {m′ ∈ MGp |∃σ′ ∈ Γ.m′σ′ = mσ} of
sources of mσ inMGp .
From these two facts and since Lw is a lattice, we have the result in Lemma 6.4
7 A SEMI-DECIDABLE PROCEDURE FOR ANALYZING CRYPTOGRAPHIC
PROTOCOLS WITH THE WITNESS-FUNCTIONS
Now, we give the protocol analysis with a Witness-Function theorem that sets a criterion for protocols cor-
rectness with respect to the secrecy property. The result in Theorem 7.1 derives directly from Proposition
6.2, Lemma 6.4 and Theorem 3.7.
Theorem 7.1. (Protocol analysis with a Witness-Function)
LetWp,F be a Witness-Function inside the protection of an external key.
A sufficient condition of correctness of p with respect to the secrecy property is:
∀R.r ∈ RG(p),∀α ∈ A(r+) we have:
u
m′∈MGp
∃σ′∈Γ.m′σ′=r+σ′
F (α, ∂[α]m′σ′) w pαq u F (α, ∂[α]R−)
Proof.
Suppose we have: ∀R.r ∈ RG(p),∀α ∈ A(r+)
u
m′∈MGp
∃σ′∈Γ.m′σ′=r+σ′
F (α, ∂[α]m′σ′) w pαq u F (α, ∂[α]R−) (14)
From Lemma 6.4 and since Lw is a lattice we have for all σ ∈ Γ:
∀α ∈ A(Mp).Wp,F (α, r+σ) w u
m′∈MGp
∃σ′∈Γ.m′σ′=r+σ′
F (α, ∂[α]m′σ′) (15)
and ∀α ∈ A(Mp).pαq u F (α, ∂[α]R−) w pαq uWp,F (α,R−σ) (16)
From 14, 15 and 16 we have:
∀α ∈ A(r+σ).Wp,F (α, r+σ) w pαq uWp,F (α,R−σ) (17)
From Proposition 6.2Wp,F is C-reliable, then we have from Theorem 3.1 and 17:
p is correct with respect to the secrecy property2
The secrecy in cryptographic protocols is in general an undecidable problem [19–23]. Theorem 7.1 defines
a semi-decidable procedure for analyzing cryptographic protocols with the Witness-Functions for the class
of increasing protocols. Hence, the problem of protocol correctness becomes a problem of protocol growth.
If the criterion in Theorem 7.1 is met, we can conclude that the protocol is correct for secrecy. Otherwise,
no decision can be made. This criterion uses the upper bound and the lower bound of a Witness-Function.
The upper bound gives a reasonable estimation of the level of security of an atom in a message on its recep-
tion. This estimation is based on selection among the external protective key and the principal identities that
travel with it under the same protection. The lower bound makes sure that no unauthorized principal identity
is maliciously inserted beside this atom on sending and therefore ensures that no intrusion could happen.
The fact that the two bounds of the Witness-Function are not affected by substitution, our semi-decidable
procedure can transfer any decision made on the generalized roles of a protocol to the valid traces and with
no restriction on their size.
If an analysis with a Witness-Function fails to prove the correctness of a protocol for secrecy, we can change
the Witness-Function by changing its function in entry. We can also have an idea about some flaw in it.
If all the Witness-Functions that we manage to build fail, we can advice an amendment to the structure
of the protocol by changing some encryption keys or principal identities in the exchanged messages in the
protocol. The procedure steps are given in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Analyzing cryptographic protocols with Witness-Functions
8 ANALYSIS OF THE NEEDHAM-SCHROEDER PROTOCOL WITH A WITNESS-
FUNCTION
In this section, we analyze the Needham-Schroeder protocol given in Example 2.2 with a Witness-Function.
Let us have a context of verification such that: pAq = ⊥; pBq = ⊥; pN iaq = {A,B} (secret between A
and B); pN ibq = {A,B} (secret between A and B); pk−1a q = {A}; pk−1b q = {B}; (L,w,unionsq,u,⊥,>) =
(2I ,⊆,∩,∪, I, ∅); I = {I(intruder), A,B,C,A1, A2, B1, B2, ...};
The set of messages generated by the protocol isMGp = {{A1.NA1}kB1 , {NA2 .X1.B2}kA2 ,{X2}kB3 , {A3.Y1}kB4 , {Y2.NB5 .B5}kA4 , {NB6}kB6 };
The variables are denoted by X1, X2, Y1 and Y2;
The static names are denoted by A1, NA1 , kB1 , NA2 , B2, kA2 , kB3 , A3, kB4 , NB5 , B5, kA4 , NB6 and kB6 ;
Let’s select the Witness-Function as follows:
p = NS; F = FEKMAX ;Wp,F (α,mσ) = u
m′∈MGp
∃σ′∈Γ.m′σ′=mσ
F (α, ∂[α]m′σ′);
Let’s denote the lower bound of the Witness-Function by:
W ′p,F (α, r+) = u
m′∈MGp
∃σ′∈Γ.m′σ′=r+σ′
F (α, ∂[α]m′σ′)
8.0.1 Analysis of the generalized role of A
As defined in the generalized roles of p, an agent A can participate in two consequent sessions: Si and Sj
such that j > i. In the former session Si, the agent A receives nothing and sends the message {A.N ia}kb .
In a consequent session Sj , she receives the message {N ia.X.B}ka and she sends the message {X}kb . This
is described by the following schema:
Si :
2
{A.N ia}kb
Sj :
{N ia.X.B}ka
{X}kb
-Analysis of the messages exchanged in the session Si:
1- For any N ia:
a- When sending: r+Si = {A.N ia}kb (in a sending step, the lower bound is used)
∀N ia.{m′ ∈MGp |∃σ′ ∈ Γ.m′σ′ = r+Siσ′}
= ∀N ia.{m′ ∈MGp |∃σ′ ∈ Γ.m′σ′ = {A.N ia}kbσ′}
= {({A1.NA1}kB1 , σ′1), ({X2}kB3 , σ′2), ({A3.Y1}kB4 , σ′3)} such that: σ
′
1 = {A1 7−→ A,NA1 7−→ N ia, kB1 7−→ kb}
σ′2 = {X2 7−→ A.N ia, kB3 7−→ kb}
σ′3 = {A3 7−→ A, Y1 7−→ N ia, kB4 7−→ kb}
W ′p,F (N ia, {A.N ia}kb)
= {Definition of the lower bound of the Witness-Function}
F (N ia, ∂[N
i
a]{A1.NA1}kB1σ′1) u F (N ia, ∂[N ia]{X2}kB3σ′2)uF (N ia, ∂[N ia]{A3.Y1}kB4σ′3)
= {Setting the static neighborhood}
F (N ia, ∂[N
i
a]{A.N ia}kbσ′1) u F (N ia, ∂[N ia]{X2}kbσ′2)uF (N ia, ∂[N ia]{A.Y1}kbσ′3)
= {Definition 5.2}
F (N ia, {A.N ia}kb) u F (X2, ∂[X2]{X2}kb)uF (Y1, ∂[Y1]{A.Y1}kb)
= {Derivation in Definition 5.1}
F (N ia, {A.N ia}kb) u F (X2, {X2}kb)uF (Y1, {A.Y1}kb)
= {Since F = FEKMAX}
{A,B} ∪ {B} ∪ {A,B} = {A,B} (1.0)
b- When receiving: R−Si = ∅ (in a receiving step, the upper bound is used)
F (N ia, ∅) = > (1.1)
2- Conformity to the criterion set by Theorem 7.1 of the exchanged messages in the session Si:
From (1.0) and (1.1), we have:
W ′p,F (N ia, {A.N ia}kb) = {A,B} w pN iaq u F (N ia, ∅) = {A,B} u > = {A,B} (1.2)
From (1.2), the messages exchanged in the session Si respect the criterion set by Theorem 7.1. (I)
-Analysis of the messages exchanged in the session Sj:
1- For any X:
a- When sending: R+Sj = {X}kb (in a sending step, the lower bound is used)
∀X.{m′ ∈MGp |∃σ′ ∈ Γ.m′σ′ = R+Sjσ′} = ∀X.{m′ ∈MGp |∃σ′ ∈ Γ.m′σ′ = {X}kbσ′}
= {({X2}kB3 , σ′1)} such that: σ′1 = {X2 7−→ X, kB3 7−→ kb}.
W ′p,F (X, {X}kb)
= {Definition of the lower bound of the Witness-Function}
F (X, ∂[X]{X2}kB3σ′1)
= {Setting the static neighborhood}
F (X, ∂[X]{X2}kbσ′1)
= {Definition 5.2}
F (X2, ∂[X2]{X2}kb)
= {Derivation in Definition 5.1}
F (X2, {X2}kb)
= {Since F = FEKMAX}
{B} (2.0)
b- When receiving: R−Sj = {N ia.X.B}ka (in a receiving step, the upper bound is used)
F (X, ∂[X]{N ia.X.B}ka) = {A,B} (2.1)
3- Conformity to the criterion set by Theorem 7.1 of the exchanged messages in the session Sj :
From (2.0) et (2.1), we have:
W ′p,F (X, {X}kb) = {B} w pXq u F (X, ∂[X]{N ia.X.B}ka) = pXq ∪ {A,B} (2.2)
From (2.2), the messages exchanged in the session Sj respect the criterion set by Theorem 7.1. (II)
From (I) and (II), the messages exchanged in the generalized role of A respect the criterion set by Theorem
7.1. (III)
8.0.2 Analysis of the generalized role of B
As defined in the generalized roles of p, an agent B can participate in a session S′
i
, in which she re-
ceives the message {A.Y }kb and she sends the message {Y.N ib .B}ka . This is described by the following
schema:
S′
i
:
{A.Y }kb
{Y.N ib .B}ka
-Analysis of the messages exchanged in the session S′
i
:
1- For any Y :
a- When sending: r+
S′i
= {Y.N ib .B}ka (in a sending step, the lower bound is used)
∀Y.{m′ ∈MGp |∃σ′ ∈ Γ.m′σ′ = r+S′iσ
′}
= ∀Y.{m′ ∈MGp |∃σ′ ∈ Γ.m′σ′ = {Y.N ib .B}kaσ′}
= {({Y2.NB5 .B5}kA4 , σ′1), ({X2}kB3 , σ′2)} such that:{
σ′1 = {Y2 7−→ Y,NB5 7−→ N ib , B5 7−→ B, kA4 7−→ ka}
σ′2 = {X2 7−→ Y.N ib .B, kB3 7−→ ka}
W ′p,F (Y, {Y.N ib .B}ka)
= {Definition of the lower bound of the Witness-Function}
F (Y, ∂[Y ]{Y2.NB5 .B5}kA4σ′1) u F (Y, ∂[Y ]{X2}kB3σ′2)
= {Setting the static neighborhood}
F (Y, ∂[Y ]{Y2.N ib .B}kaσ′1) u F (Y, ∂[Y ]{X2}kaσ′2)
= {Definition 5.2}
F (Y2, ∂[Y2]{Y2.N ib .B}ka) u F (X2, ∂[X2]{X2}ka)
= {Derivation in Definition 5.1}
F (Y2, {Y2.N ib .B}ka) u F (X2, {X2}ka)
= {Since F = FEKMAX}
{A,B} ∪ {A} = {A,B} (3.0)
b- When receiving: R−
S′i
= {A.Y }kb (in a receiving step, the upper bound is used)
F (Y, ∂[Y ]{A.Y }kb) = {A,B}(3.1)
2- For any N ib :
a- When sending: r+
S′i
= {Y.N ib .B}ka (in a sending step, the lower bound is used)
∀N ib .{m′ ∈MGp |∃σ′ ∈ Γ.m′σ′ = r+S′iσ
′}
= ∀N ib .{m′ ∈MGp |∃σ′ ∈ Γ.m′σ′ = {Y.N ib .B}kaσ′}
= {({Y2.NB5 .B5}kA4 , σ′1), ({X2}kB3 , σ′2), ({A3.Y1}kB4 , σ′3)} such that:
 σ
′
1 = {Y2 7−→ Y,NB5 7−→ N ib , B5 7−→ B, kA4 7−→ ka}
σ′2 = {X2 7−→ Y.N ib .B, kB3 7−→ ka}
σ′3 = {Y 7−→ A3, Y1 7−→ N ib .B, kB4 7−→ ka}
W ′p,F (N ib , {Y.N ib .B}ka)
= {Definition of the lower bound of the Witness-Function}
F (N ib , ∂[N
i
b ]{Y2.NB5 .B5}kA4σ′1)uF (N ib , ∂[N ib ]{X2}kB3σ′2) u F (N ib , ∂[N ib ]{A3.Y1}kB4σ′3)
= {Setting the static neighborhood}
F (N ib , ∂[N
i
b ]{Y2.N ib .B}kaσ′1)u
F (N ib , ∂[N
i
b ]{X2}kaσ′2) u F (N ib , ∂[N ib ]{A3.Y1}kaσ′3)
= {Definition 5.2}
F (N ib , {N ib .B}ka)uF (X2, ∂[X2]{X2}ka) u F (Y1, ∂[Y1]{A3.Y1}ka)
= {Derivation in Definition 5.1}
F (N ib , {N ib .B}ka)uF (X2, {X2}ka) u F (Y1, {A3.Y1}ka)
= {Since F = FEKMAX}
{A,B} ∪ {A} ∪ {A3, A} = {A,B,A3} (3.2)
b- When receiving: R−
S′i
= {A.Y }kb (in a receiving step, the upper bound is used)
F (N ib , ∂[N
i
b ]{A.Y }kb) = > (3.3)
3- Conformity to the criterion set by Theorem 7.1 of the exchanged messages in the session S′
i
:
From (3.0) et (3.1), we have:
W ′p,F (Y, {Y.N ib .B}ka) = {A,B} w pY q u F (Y, ∂[Y ]{A.Y }kb) = pY q ∪ {A,B}(3.4)
From (3.2) et (3.3), we have:
W ′p,F (N ib , {Y.N ib .B}ka) = {A,B,A3} 6w pN ibquF (N ib , ∂[N ib ]{A.Y }kb) = pN ibqu> = pN ibq = {A,B}
(3.5). From (3.5), the messages exchanged in the session S′
i
do not respect the criterion set by Theorem
7.1. (IV)
8.1 Results and Interpretation
The results of the analysis of the variation of Needham-Schroeder protocol are summarized in Table 3.
We notice from Table 3 that the variation of Needham-Schroeder protocol does not respect the criterion
set by Theorem 7.1 when analyzed with the witness-functionWp
NS
,FEKMAX
. Therefore, we cannot deduce
anything regarding its correctness with respect to the secrecy property. The non-growth of the protocol is
localized in the sending step of the generalized role of B and it is due to a possible malicious neighbor
(denoted by A3 in our analysis) that could be inserted beside the nonce N iB . In the literature, we report a
flaw that operates on the decay of the level of security of the nonce N iB in the generalized role of B. This
flaw is described by the attack scenario in Figure.2.
Table 3: Conformity of the Needham-Schroeder Protocol to Theorem 7.1
α Role R− r+ W ′p,F (α, r+) pαq F (α, ∂[α]R−) Theorem 7.1
N ia A ∅ {A.N ia}kb {A,B} {A,B} > Fulfilled
∀X A {N ia.X.B}ka {X}kb {B} pXq {A,B} Fulfilled
∀Y B {A.Y }kb {Y.N ib .B}ka {A,B} pY q {A,B} Fulfilled
N ib B {A.Y }kb {Y.N ib .B}ka {A,B,A3} {A,B} {A,B} Not Fulfilled
I
{A. I︸︷︷︸
Ni
I(A)
}kb
- B
?
B -
{I.N ib .B︸ ︷︷ ︸
NI
}ka
A
Aff
{N ib .B.N ia.A}kI
I
Figure 2: Attack Scenario on the Needham-Schroeder Protocol
9 ANALYSIS OF THE NSL PROTOCOL WITH A WITNESS-FUNCTION
In this section, we analyze the NSL protocol with a witness-function given in Example 2.3. Let’s have a
context of verification such that: pAq = ⊥; pBq = ⊥; pN iaq = {A,B}; pN ibq = {A,B}; pk−1a q = {A};
pk−1b q = {B}; (L,w,unionsq,u,⊥,>) = (2I ,⊆,∩,∪, I, ∅); I = {I, A,B,A1, A2,B1, B2, ...};
The set of messages generated by the protocol isMGp = {{NA1 .A1}kB1 , {B2.NA2}kA2 , {B3.X1}kA3 ,{X2}kB4 , {Y1.A4}kB5 , {B7.NB7}kA6 , {NB8}kB8}
The variables are denoted by X1, X2, Y1 and Y2; The static names are denoted by NA1 , A1, kB1 , B2, NA2 ,
kA2 , B3, kA3 , kB4 , A4, kB5 , B7, NB7 , kA6 , NB8 and kB8 .
9.1 Results and Interpretation
The results of analysis of the NSL protocol are summarized in Table 4. We notice from Table 4 that the
Table 4: Conformity of NSL Protocol to Theorem 7.1
α Role R− r+ W ′p,F (α, r+) pαq F (α, ∂[α]R−) Theorem 7.1
N ia A ∅ {A.N ia}kb {A,B} {A,B} > Fulfilled
∀X A {B.N ia}ka .{B.X}ka A.B.{X}kb {B} pXq {A,B} Fulfilled
∀Y B {A.Y }kb {B.Y }ka .{B.N ib}ka {A,B} pY q {A,B} Fulfilled
N ib B {A.Y }kb {B.Y }ka .{B.N ib}ka {A,B} {A,B} {A,B} Fulfilled
NSL protocol respects the correctness criterion stated in Theorem 7.1, therefore it is correct with respect to
the secrecy property.
10 COMPARISON WITH RELATED WORKS
Houmani et al. in [5–8] defined universal functions to analyze protocols. Although they gave a com-
prehensive guideline to build these functions, only two functions had been concretely defined: DEK and
DEKAN. That is due to the difficulty to find, and after to prove, that a function satisfies to the property
of full-invariance by substitution. With a Witness-Function, there is no need to this property. A Witness-
Function operates on derivative messages instead of messages of the generalized roles of a protocol which
reduces variables’ effect. It also offers two helpful bounds that do not depend on substitutions. This relaxes
the conditions made on the associated interpretation functions and allows us to have more reliable func-
tions and therefore to prove secrecy in a wider range of protocols. In addition, our method does not need
any complicated context as do the rank-functions of Schneider in [1] that require the CSP formalism [24].
It does not need neither a strong message-typing as required by Abadi in [25]. Our method joins though
Houmani’s method and Schneider’s method in the way of seeing secrecy in a protocol through its growth.
11 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we suggested a new semi-decidable procedure to analyze cryptographic protocols with the
Witness-Functions based on selection inside the external protective key for the property of secrecy. We
experimented our approach on real protocols and we showed that the Witness-functions can even help to
teach about flaws. They were successful to prove secrecy in others too. As a future work, we intend to define
more Witness-Functions based on selection inside other keys like the most internal key or a group of keys
together to enlarge the range of protocols that could be proved correct. We intend also to check our approach
on protocols with non-empty theories [26–28]. In addition, we intend to take advantage of the bounds
offered by Witness-Functions so that we can use exchanged messages in a protocol as encryption keys. We
think also to extend our approach so that it can deal with other security properties like authentication and
integrity.
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